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The Inadequate and Dependent ""Adequate
and Independent State Grounds"
Doctrine
ERIC B. SCHNURER*
There is a story about the American philosopher Sidney Mor-
ganbesser, who is known among philosophers as quite a wit. Once,
at a conference on the philosophy of language, the main speaker,
reporting on a career of exhaustive research, declared that, while
there are many languages in the world which sometimes employ a
double negative to express a positive, there is no known grammati-
cal construction in any language in which a double positive is used
to express a negative.
At this point, Morganbesser called dismissively from the back
of the room "Yeah, yeah." - Anonymous
The "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine is a double-
negative that instead often winds up in the affirmative. As Professor Ter-
rance Sandalow has written, "The rule is usually stated negatively:
'Where the decision of the state court is deemed to rest upon a non-
federal ground which independently and adequately supports the state
court judgment, the Supreme Court will not exercise jurisdiction to re-
view notwithstanding the raising of federal questions upon the state court
record or the decision of these questions by the state court.' "'
In short, if a state court decision rests on grounds that are not fed-
eral, and do not rely upon federal law to resolve the issue, then the
* A.B., Brown University, 1980; M.P.P., Harvard University, 1983; J.D., Columbia
University, 1986. The author, formerly Deputy General Counsel of Pennsylvania, is currently
in private practice in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This Article is adapted from a speech deliv-
ered to the State and Local Legal Center, Washington, D.C. Thanks to Steve Ross, Jerome
Marcus, Deborah Malamud, and Gary Sutnick.
1. Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Re-
vised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 187, 189 n.9 (quoting R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM,
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 163 (R. Wolfson & P. Kur-
land 2d ed. 1951)) (emphasis added).
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United States Supreme Court will not review the ruling. At least, in
theory.2
In practice, the double-negative of the "adequate and independent
state grounds" test does not stop the Justices from saying "yes" to a case
if they so desire. 3 This is not because the doctrine is wrong-in fact, it
serves valid constitutional and prudential (that is, economic) ends. It is
rather that, just as Justice Harlan said "one man's vulgarity is another
man's lyric,"4 so too one Justice's adequate state ground is another Jus-
tice's flimsy pretext-and one's independent state ground is another's
muddling of federal precedent.
1. The Not-So-Independent State Ground
Prior to Michigan v. Long,5 the presumption was that an asserted
state ground was independent and that the United States Supreme Court
would not review the state court's determination. Michigan v. Long re-
versed that presumption, declaring that the Supreme Court would review
state court decisions which alluded to federal bases for decision, unless
the state court made a "plain statement" that the determination of state
law did not actually rest on federal law.6
A. State Court Responses to Long
The Michigan v. Long standard for assessing the "independence" of
the state ground is unnecessarily constricted. To see why, let us consider
the possible state court responses to such a federal doctrine.
2. The roots of the doctrine lie in Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935);
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36 (1874); and Klinger v. Missouri,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257, 263 (1871).
3. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493
(1984); Florida v. Myers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984); Maine v. Thornton, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Cali-
fornia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
4. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
5. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In Long, the substantive issue before the Court was whether a
search of an automobile interior was consistent with the Fourth Amendment under the "pro-
tective search" rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Long, 463 U.S. at 1034-35,
1045-65. The Michigan Supreme Court had reversed Long's conviction for possession of mari-
juana found in a search of his automobile as violative of the Terry rationale, concluding "that
the deputies' search of the vehicle was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution." 413 Mich. 461, 472-73, 320
N.W.2d 866, 870 (1982) (quoted in Long, 463 U.S. at 1037 n.3).
6. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
L Eschewal of Federal Grounds
The first way that state courts could respond to the challenge of
Michigan v. Long would be to avoid the problem entirely by refusing to
reach federal questions at all.7 As one of our leading authorities on fed-
eral courts has noted, "[T]here can be no review [in the Supreme Court]
if the state court has decided the case exclusively on some ground of state
law, and has never reached a federal question present in the case."'
Now, of course, this is not possible in the extreme-it is fairly well
settled that state courts may not refuse to hear federal questions.9 State
courts also may not erect unreasonable procedural barriers to the airing
of federal claims.10 Resolution of a case may thus turn upon determina-
tion of a federal question, and a state court cannot very well avoid reach-
ing the federal issue in such an instance.
But state courts may eschew determinations of federal law when
such determinations are not necessary to resolution of the case. This is
something of a Hohfeldian correlative 1 of the "adequate and independ-
ent state grounds" doctrine: While the United States Supreme Court will
not inject the federal courts into a state case when it can be adequately
resolved on purely state law grounds, so can state courts refrain from
injecting federal questions into cases when they can similarly be resolved
purely on state law grounds. In short, state courts can resort to resolving
cases on state law grounds-including state constitutional grounds-
whenever possible and, if the state ground is more encompassing than the
federal, avoid any need even to discuss the federal issue. 12
7. See infra note 12.
8. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 544 (3d ed. 1976) (cit-
ing Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); McCoy v. Shaw, 277 U.S. 302 (1928)).
9. See, eg., Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392-94
(1947); see also P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 492-500 (3d ed. 1988).
10. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
11. "HOHFELDIAN. Adjective formed from the name of the American jurist W.N.
Hohfeld, (1879-1918), whose study Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (first version, 1917 [sic]) represents a major clarification of the concept of a legal
right." A. BULLOCK & 0. STALLYBRASS, THE HARPER DICTIONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT
287 (1977) (entry written by H.L.A. Hart). For instance, as Hohfeld explained, "'Duty' and
'right' are correlative terms. When a right is invaded, a duty is violated." Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32 (1913)
(quoting Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Kurtz, 10 Ind. App. 60, 67, 37 N.E. 303, 304 (1894)).
See also Note, "More Than an Intuition, Less Than a Theory': Toward a Coherent Doctrine of
Standing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 564, 575-76 & nn.66-67 (1986).
12. For instance, the Oregon Supreme Court established an explicit policy two years prior
to Long of relying on the state constitution to dispose fully of claims before resorting to any
arguments arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625
P.2d 123 (1981). Compare People v. Rolfmngsmeyer, 101 Ill. 2d 137, 461 N.E.2d 410 (1984)
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In fact, not only can state courts take such an approach, they
should. State court reliance primarily on state rather than federal law,
particularly in the constitutional field, is preferable for several reasons.
The first is that it conforms to the general nature of our federalist legal
hierarchy: The United States operates in many ways under a system of
"dual sovereignty," with citizens simultaneously subject to the laws of
two governments, state and federal, both of which are "sovereign."
Needless to say, however, in case of conflict one or the other "sovereign"
must yield. The Constitution makes plain which one it is: The
Supremacy Clause ranks the federal Constitution and laws "the supreme
Law of the Land."13
Under well-established principles, the United States Constitution
should be resorted to only when absolutely necessary to dispose of a
case.1 g It follows that the Ashwander policies espoused by Justice Bran-
deis and endorsed repeatedly by the Supreme Court are served by resolv-
ing cases on "inferior" sources of law whenever possible, and that state
laws, including state constitutions, are "inferior" in this sense.15 In addi-
(resting on state constitutional provision limiting self-incrimination in the area of implied con-
sent to submit to a sobriety test), with State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981) (reaching
same result, but on basis of both federal and state constitutions), rev'd, South Dakota v. Nev-
ille, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), and State v. Jackson, 195 Mont. 185, 637 P.2d 1 (1981) (same),
vacated, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983), on remand, 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983) (state constitu-
tional ruling vitiated in light of United States Supreme Court interpretation of federal Consti-
tution in Neville). See also Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 294 Or. 33, 653 P.2d 970
(1982) (looking solely to state constitutional provisions); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158,
432 A.2d 1382 (1981). For a discussion of methods to insulate decisions based on state
grounds from Supreme Court review, see Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S.
CAL. L. R-v. 750 (1972).
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, Cl. 2.
14. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Bran-
deis, in a classic statement, elucidated seven rules developed to avoid "passing upon a large
part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon [the Court] for decision." Id. at 346.
Those relevant here include that the Court: will not decide questions of constitutional law not
necessary to resolving the case, will not pass upon constitutional questions if other grounds,
including statutory, common, or state law, are sufficient, and will not reach a constitutional
question if a statute can be construed so as to avoid any claim of unconstitutionality. See id. at
346-48.
15. See, eg., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555 (1940) (citation omitted):
Enough has been said to demonstrate that there is considerable uncertainty as to
the precise grounds for the decision. That is sufficient reason for us to decline at this
time to review the federal question asserted to be present, consistently with the policy
of not passing upon questions of a constitutional nature which are not clearly neces-
sary to a decision of the case.
See also Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 460 U.S. 1074 (1983) (remand for
consideration of possible state grounds, the decision of which might obviate the need to ad-
dress a federal constitutional question); Paschall v. Christie-Stewart, Inc., 414 U.S. 100 (1973)
(same); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) (same).
tion, as Justice Stewart Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court ob-
served, such an approach "is faithful to historical sequence when a state's
constitution predated the federal constitution. It also is consistent with
the proposition that state constitutions are the basic charters of individ-
ual liberties."16
Second, and relatedly, state court eschewal of federal questions
when not necessary to resolve a case reduces the negative effects of essen-
tially advisory opinions on federal law.17 In that context, the question is
simply whether the courts of one sovereign ought properly to render
opinions on the laws of another sovereign when to do so is not necessary
to the disposition of the case before it. The federal courts, despite state
court perceptions of federal arrogance, have a long-standing preference
for deference to the state courts, which is elaborated in the fields of ab-
stention18 and habeas corpus review. 19 To the extent that the "adequate
and independent state grounds" doctrine is prudential rather than juris-
dictional,2" it also reflects this same policy. It does not seem unreasona-
ble to expect state courts to exercise the same deference to federal
hegemony over federal law;21 such hegemony also promotes the federal
goal of uniformity of interpretation of federal law, a staple of federal ju-
16. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Rela-
tionship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L. REv. 977, 983-84 (1985).
17. Of course, for many state court systems the advisory opinion doctrine does not pose
the same jurisdictional dilemmas as it does in the federal system. Moreover, since alternative
grounds of decision are both holdings-that is, neither are dictum-when a case can be dis-
posed of by either a federal or state law ruling the federal determination cannot be said to be
truly "advisory." See Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 340
(1928). So we are dealing here with a question of comity, not of power.
18. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-17 (1987) (applying abstention
doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), because of the state's interest in enforcing
the judgments and orders of its courts, and because the Court would not assume that state
courts were unable to decide federal questions or would do so improperly); Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (extending Pullman abstention to situations in
which "sovereign prerogatives" and complicated areas of state law are involved); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (federal courts should abstain from decisions in
which federal constitutional questions can be avoided and interference with state organs
averted if the decision is based on the state issues).
19. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-96 (1976) (although federal courts do not
lack jurisdiction and fourth amendment violation may in fact have occurred, federal court
should not consider claim of constitutional violation where defendant had "full and fair" op-
portunity to litigate issue in state court).
20. See Sandalow, supra note 1, at 188 n.6.
21. But see Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Fed-
eral Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEx. L.
Rnv. 1025, 1048 n.156 (1985) (arguing that state courts are "no less privileged to discover" the
meaning of federal law than are federal courts, and that "[i]f one believes the federal system
will benefit from dialogue about the Constitution, then the fact that the state court opinion is
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risdiction doctrine since at least Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.22
Third, state court avoidance of federal questions in favor of resolu-
tion on a state basis serves values of judicial economy: Why bring the
Supreme Court into it if you do not have to? Not only is needless
Supreme Court review invited where a state court fails to resist the urge
to expound upon federal law, but also the state court's own time will
likely be further consumed with reiterating its original state-law holding
following a United States Supreme Court remand. In fact, Justice Ste-
vens has taken to task one state supreme court explicitly on this basis for
premising a decision on federal grounds.23
2. The Tendency of State Courts to Ignore Long
Of course, not all courts are inclined to follow this wisdom, for sev-
eral reasons. One is that old habits die hard, and most lawyers, including
those who are now judges, are not accustomed to addressing state consti-
tutional issues or to ignoring federal ones. A related although less com-
plimentary reason may be that many state court judges are not prepared
to address or create an independent body of state reasoning if federal
precedents appear to dispose of the issue.24
Justice Pollock of New Jersey calls such an approach, addressing
state constitutional issues only if necessary after resolving federal consti-
tutional questions, the "supplemental" approach to state constitutional
law. He argues that "the supplemental approach is more consistent with
the roles of state and federal constitutional law as those roles have
evolved in this century. Since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, federal jurisprudence has exercised the dominant influence on con-
stitutional law."25 Others feel that it is important for state courts to
reach and discuss independent federal claims, either out of thoroughness
or out of a commitment to the value of widespread and diverse interpre-
22. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).
23. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 735-37 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). See
also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 566-71 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. As one leading state supreme court justice has written:
There are several possible reasons for a court's failure to examine the state con-
stitution. One explanation may be judicial oversight and carelessness. Another may
be that the court might not have been ready to decide the state constitutional issue;
or the author of the majority opinion might not be receptive to state constitutional
arguments ....
Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional
Law, 63 Tax. L. Rv. 1141, 1160 (1985).
25. Pollock, supra note 16, at 984.
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tation of the federal Constitution.26
But the fact remains that many state court judges simply seem to be
unaware that Michigan v. Long provides a clear method by which state
court judges can insulate their decisions from federal review. As one
state high court judge has told me, "I keep trying to get my colleagues to
include a Michigan v. Long statement in order to keep the decision away
from the Supreme Court, but they just don't seem to understand."
3. The "Surgeon General's Warning" Approach
When a state court feels compelled for whatever reason to address a
federal question, the Supreme Court has at least given it a simple method
by which it can establish an "adequate and independent state ground"
and thereby evade federal review. This method is to include a "plain
statement" that the court meant to rest its holding on state, and not on
federal, grounds.2 . This step is in essence a disclaimer system: So long
as the state court explicitly disclaims any intention of making federal
law, it can prattle on all it wants about federal precedents and the mean-
ing of extant Supreme Court opinions.28
As might be expected, some state courts have taken the Supreme
Court at its word and adopted a sort of "Surgeon General's Warning" to
be inserted into any opinion in which both state and federal grounds for a
26. See supra note 21. As I have indicated, I believe that the notion of the inherent value
of state court interpretation of the federal Constitution is incorrect, and conflicts with the
values announced by the federal courts, whose views on development of their own law should
control over those of the state courts. This is a completely different issue, of course, from the
value of the development of state constitutional law independent of federal constitutional de-
velopment. See Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 42 RECORD OF Ass'N
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 285 (1987); Schnurer, It Is A Constitution We Are
Expanding: An Essay on Constitutional Past, Present and Future, I EMERGING ISSUES IN ST.
CONST. L. 135 (1988).
27. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
28. As the Supreme Court has noted, when a nonfederal ground is sufficient to sustain the
judgment "we have no power to disturb it." Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal
Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917). See also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) ("our power
is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions").
Thus, in State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 235, 471 A.2d 347, 353 (1983), after declaring a
search invalid under the state constitution, the New Hampshire Supreme Court launched into
a gratuitous discussion of the federal Constitution with the comment, "We note that the
United States Supreme Court has recently spoken on the probable cause requirement of the
plain view doctrine." Similarly, in State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 448, 450 A.2d 336, 346 (1982)
(citations omitted), the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the question of suppression of evi-
dence under both the state and federal constitutions, noting that while "[o]n federal issues, we
are no more than an intermediate court, ... if our ruling is based upon an adequate and
independent state ground, federal review is limited to a determination of whether Vermont law
violates some provision of federal law."
Winter 19911
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holding are discussed.29 Of course, a requirement that such a consumer
warning label appear in every opinion would seem to be rather tedious.
Thus, Justice Souter's former court, the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
took the logical step, shortly after Michigan v. Long, of publishing in one
opinion the following "quit-claim": "We hereby make clear that when
this court cites federal or other State court opinions in construing provi-
sions of the New Hampshire Constitution or statutes, we rely on those
precedents merely for guidance and do not consider our results bound by
those decisions."
30
This declaration exposes the absurdity of the Michigan v. Long rule.
Certainly, a court should be able to take the position taken by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court. In fact, its statement is merely a summary
of the role of persuasive authority that any first-year law student would
immediately recognize and comprehend. But if the requirements of
Michigan v. Long are met by simply publishing such a disclaimer once
and for all, then what does Long really amount to?
On the other hand, if the once-and-for-all disclaimer is not suffi-
cient, then we are back to rote recitation of the disclaimer in every case.
Such a rule is patently unbecoming. It is a commonplace of federal prac-
tice today that totemic invocations are not required in pleadings.31 If
litigants, who are due no deference, are not expected by the federal courts
to kowtow to catechismal verbal formulations, then certainly state
judges-who are accorded some degree of deference by federal courts-
ought not to be so required either. It trivializes the role of judging in
both the state courts and the United States Supreme Court if the out-
come turns not on an appreciation of the logic of decision but rather
upon the incantation vel non of magic words.32
B. What's so Wrong with Long?
The major problem with Long goes a bit deeper than this, however.
Under Long, the Supreme Court essentially has said that rather than
presuming that state judges have come to their own reasoned analysis of
29. See Ball, 124 N.H. at 233, 471 A.2d at 352; State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1019
(R.I.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984).
30. Ball, 124 N.H. at 233, 471 A.2d at 352. See also State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 267,
666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983) (general statement that when the Oregon Supreme Court cites
federal precedent in interpreting Oregon law, it does so because it finds the federal precedent
persuasive, not controlling).
31. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
32. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 571 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(terming it "denigrating... to require the justices of the 50 State Supreme Courts to include
such a statement in their decisions").
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their own law, however misguided their reliance on federal caselaw as
persuasive authority might be, the Court will instead presume that state
court judges are simply too lazy to have really independently interpreted
their own laws.33
Such a presumption condescends to state judges and denigrates the
concept of federalism, particularly with respect to state court compe-
tence-generally advocated in the habeas context by precisely those on
the Court who supported the Michigan v. Long doctrine in the direct
review context.34
It will be interesting to see whether Justice Souter joins this conde-
scending view of state high courts. In the past decade, the Court's two
former state court judges, Justices Brennan and O'Connor, split on this
issue along result-oriented, ideological grounds. In fact, the "adequate
and independent state grounds" doctrine has been used generally to serve
the Court's current ideological aims.
3 5
As has been widely noted, state courts have long been viewed as less
than vigilant in their protection of individual liberties. 36 For most of its
history, the same could be said of the United States Supreme Court.
Only in the Warren Era did the Court attain the image of the great bul-
wark of civil rights and civil liberties.37 When that occurred, a diver-
33. Thus, for instance, Professor Lawrence Sager asserts that Long "canonizes the some-
what odd presumption that state judges are deeply under the sway of federal precedent, even
when they are avowedly interpreting their own state constitutions." Sager, Foreword: State
Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L.
REv. 959, 959 n.1 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
35. For instance, compare Justice Brennan's assault on state procedural bars in Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), infra note 42 and accompanying text, and Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963), infra note 60 and accompanying text, with his dissent in Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 560 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting), in which he would have found a
determination that a lower state court had not followed a remand order from the state supreme
court to be a sufficient bar to the United States Supreme Court's determination of whether a
criminal defendant's federal right to counsel had been violated. For the views of Justice
O'Connor and other members of the Burger/Rehnquist Courts' majority, see infra note 41.
36. See Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST.
CONST. L. 1, 6 (1988).
37. In all American history no better period than that from the mid-1950s through
the 1960s can be offered as an example of one when a close link occurred between
political and social change and the performance of the Supreme Court. Dynamic
and extensive political and social change nurtured the sentiment of the Supreme
Court under Warren and in a reciprocal manner the Court fostered the development
of that political and social change....
Affected by the current political and social trends, the Warren Court worked a
revolution in constitutional law.
A. RICE, THE WARREN COURT, 1953-1969, 8 THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE ix-x
(G. Lankevich ed. 1987).
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gence arose between the conceptions of individual liberties in the United
States Supreme Court and the state supreme courts.38 Justice Brennan
and the other members of the Court remedied this situation by altering
the "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine to "reach out
and touch" more errant state court opinions.3 9
When the Warren Court transformed rapidly and dramatically
under President Nixon into the Burger Court and, later, the Rehnquist
Court, those who had previously looked to the Supreme Court for judi-
cial protection began turning, partly at the incessant urging of Justice
Brennan,4° to the state courts. State benches are now filled largely with
lawyers who were drawn to the bar and cut their teeth during the Warren
Era. There is, thus, again a divergence-although running the other
way-between the conceptions of individual liberties in the United States
Supreme Court and the state supreme courts. And, mirabile dictu, Jus-
tice O'Connor and the other members of the Court have remedied this
situation by altering the "adequate and independent state grounds" doc-
trine to "reach out and touch" more errant state court opinions.41
38. See Howard, supra note 36, at 6.
39. See Henry, 379 U.S. 443; see also infra note 42.
40. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489 (1977).
41. Ironically, the same Court that has made federalism the centerpiece of its consti-
tutional philosophy now regularly upsets state court decisions protecting individual
rights. During its 1982 term the Court favorably reviewed nearly four of every 10
petitions brought to it by government officials dissatisfied with state court rulings
sustaining civil liberties claims. Incredibly, during the same term the justices did not
review a single case brought to their regular docket by an individual whose constitu-
tional challenge was denied by a state court.
Collins, Plain Statements: The Supreme Court's New Requirement, 70 A.B.A. J. 92 (Mar.
1984) (citing Welsh, Whose Federalism?-The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liber-
ties Judgments, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 827 (1983)).
As Justice Stevens notes in his dissent in Long, "Until recently [the Court] had virtually
no interest in" cases in which a state sought review of a decision of its own courts vindicating a
federal right. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1069 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In 1953,
the Court received one such request and reviewed the case; in the 1967 Term, it received three
requests and reviewed none. Id At the time of Long, the Court had reviewed twelve other
such cases that Term, while certiorari petitions had been filed in eighty. Id at 1070 n.3. Ste-
vens dates this change to "[s]ome time during the past decade," id. at 1069, suggesting as a
possible turning point the Court's "5-to-4 decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)." Id at 1070. Justice Stevens says ambiguously, "[O]ur priorities
shifted." Id. This is more oblique than attributing the change directly to the Court's changing
views toward law enforcement during the same period.
Justice O'Connor comes closer to saying this herself. In response to Justice Stevens' as-
sertion that the Court should concern itself primarily with vindicating federal rights of individ-
uals, see id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra note 63, O'Connor retorts simply
that "[t]he state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigation in this country." 463 U.S.
at 1043 n.8. She concludes, "It is not surprising that this Court has become more interested in
the application and development of federal law by state courts in the light of the recent signifi-
STATE GROUNDS DOCTRINE
The differences between Justice Brennan's permutations of the "ade-
quate and independent state grounds" doctrine and those of the Michi-
gan v. Long Court spring from the fact that the Long approach extends
the reach of the Supreme Court into state court rulings by questioning
the "independence" of state court reasoning. The Warren Court, in con-
trast, extended its reach into state decisions by questioning the "ade-
quacy" of the state court reasoning in such cases as Henry v.
Mississippi.42 We will see the ramifications of this distinction when I con-
clude with some comments on adequacy.
As for the independence of state grounds, however, the Court ought
to return to the pre-Long presumption of independence (rather than non-
independence) of the state law interpretation. As Professor Charles
Wright has observed, "since the burden is on the party invoking the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court to establish that that Court has jurisdic-
tion, it may dismiss if its jurisdiction is ambiguous."'43 The Court thus
should presume that a state court decision rests on an independent state
ground unless the party seeking review can demonstrate that the state
court found its interpretation of the state provision to depend upon fed-
eral law-thereby avoiding Supreme Court pronouncements on federal
law that will not, a priori, disturb the result in the case.
cant expansion of federally created standards that we have imposed on the States." Id. (em-
phasis added). That comment rather misses the mark, however. The job undertaken by the
cases evidencing this greater interest in the application and development of federal law by state
courts, of which Long is an example, has been to deflate the "federally created standards...
imposed on the States." Id Compare, for example, Justice Rehnquist's votes to assume juris-
diction in criminal cases such as Long, with his assertion in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Jerome, 434 U.S. 241 (1978) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This case concerned first
amendment rights of press access to pretrial suppression hearings in state criminal proceed-
ings. Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Court should not assume jurisdiction unless a federal
basis of the decision below is demonstrated. See id. at 244 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. 379 U.S. 443 (1965). The Henry case concerned a highly publicized and politically
explosive criminal trial of a leading civil rights advocate. The state courts had admitted that
illegally obtained evidence had been introduced at the trial, but upheld the conviction on the
ground that Henry had failed to comply with the requirements of the state's "contemporane-
ous objection" rule governing the admission of evidence. Henry v. State, 253 Miss. 263, 279-
81, 154 So. 2d 289, 295-96 (1963). Justice Brennan argued that, while the adequate state
ground doctrine applied to procedural as well as substantive rules, state procedural rules could
not, like state substantive law, be determinative of a case's outcome regardless of determina-
tion of the federal right, nor could they be permitted to interfere with vindication of federal
rights unless the procedural rule serves a legitimate state interest. Id. at 447. The ramifica-
tions of this distinction are developed further in Part II.
43. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 547 (3d ed. 1976). See
also cases cited therein, id. at 547 n.95; Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 281, 285 (1956) (peti-
tioner bears burden of establishing Supreme Court's jurisdiction).
Thus, see Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541, 547 (1952) (case dismissed where grounds
of state court decision unclear); Lynch v. New York ex reL Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1934)
(same).
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Regardless of how conscientious a state court is in attaching a "Sur-
geon General's Warning" to all its opinions or how lackadaisical in
warming over the reasoning of federal courts in analogous areas, a state
ruling should be taken to be "independent" of federal law if it is not, in
the state court's view, compelled by federal precedent.
Now, when does such a situation occur? There is, first of all, the
odd case of Florida, where this occurs every time an issue involving crim-
inal defendants arises. This is because the people of Florida amended
their constitution to require that it be interpreted in line with United
States Supreme Court decisions on the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. 4
This is an extreme case, but it is not the only instance in which state
courts feel that the content of their state constitutional provisions are
controlled by the content of parallel federal provisions. For instance, in
Delaware v. Prouse,45 the Supreme Court reviewed a Delaware decision
involving that state's counterpart to the Fourth Amendment's Search
and Seizure Clause. The Delaware Supreme Court had held the search
in Prouse violative of both the federal and state constitutions.46 The
Supreme Court, per Justice White, found that the decision did not rest on
an independent and adequate state ground, because "at the very least, the
[state] court felt compelled by what it understood to be federal constitu-
tional considerations to construe.., its own law in the manner it did."47
But the state court's conclusions of federal law are integral to the
holding, and therefore properly reviewable by the Supreme Court, only if
the state court believes that it must follow federal law to interpret the
state provision.a It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has held
that it may review a state court decision where a state statute incorpo-
rates federal law by reference-passing on the federal question incorpo-
rated by reference, and remanding for the state court to reconsider the
statute in the light of the "correct" interpretation of the underlying fed-
44. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 (1983) (per curiam) (Bur-
ger, C.J., concurring). In this unusual concurrence in a dismissal of certiorari, Chief Justice
Burger noted that Florida voters had amended their state constitution following the state court
decision in question to preclude a repetition of what he termed the "untoward" result in this
case, and then observed that Florida voters could also force repeal of the state statute on which
the Florida court seemed to have rested in part.
45. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
46. State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1362, 1364 (1978).
47. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562, 568 (1977)).
48. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 732 n.1 (1983); South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553, 556 n.5 (1983); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653; Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 568.
eral law.49
But when a state court looks to federal law as persuasive authority,
even adopting the perceived reasoning wholesale, but does not announce
that the state's constitution must be interpreted consistent with a federal
provision, this is not properly reviewable by the United States Supreme
Court. The state court decision does not constitute a holding as to the
content of federal law that requires-or permits-Supreme Court correc-
tion. The Supreme Court cannot correct fallacious rationalizing of fed-
eral law used for purposes of analogy, but not legal mandate, in state
court opinions. 50
It might be difficult in some concrete instances to tell whether a
state court has in fact simply adopted what it perceives to be federal
reasoning because of admiration of the logic of the reasoning, because of
pure laziness, or because the court believed itself bound as a matter of
state law by whatever it perceived to be the federal law.51 In instances
when indicia of dependence, rather than simple reliance, upon federal
law are absent, the better course is to presume that the state ground is
indeed independent of any discussion in the opinion of what federal law
might be.
But, in any event, if the question is truly in doubt, then at the least
the Supreme Court should, in terms of both federalism principles and
judicial economy, ask the state court for clarification on this point, rather
than assume jurisdiction and possibly needlessly decide the federal ques-
tion. Before Michigan v. Long52 that was essentially the practice,53 and it
should be the law once again.
49. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
50. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) ("[O]ur power is to correct wrong judg-
ments, not to revise opinions.").
51. See, e.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 196-98 (1965), on
remand, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965) (per curiam) (upholding prior
decision as mandated by state constitution); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555-
57 (1940), on remand, 208 Minn. 607, 294 N.W. 230 (1940) (upholding prior decision as man-
dated by state constitution); State Tax Comm'n v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1939), on
remand, 98 Utah 264, 96 P.2d 740 (1939) (upholding prior state court decision as correct
interpretation of state legislative intent). See also Neville, 459 U.S. 553; Prouse, 440 U.S. 648;
supra text accompanying notes 45-46; Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562; Department of Motor Vehicles
v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425, 426 (1973); Herb, 324 U.S. at 127-28.
52. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
53. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241 (1978); California v.
Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972); cf Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (where
state law unclear and federal constitutional question can be avoided, federal court should ab-
stain from deciding federal question pending resort to state court for determination of state law
question).
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II. The Not-So-Adequate State Ground
In order to bar Supreme Court review, a state ground must be not
only "independent" but also "adequate." Inadequacy comes in many
guises: a lack of fair and substantial support in the facts,54 a new state
rule employed for the occasion in order to defeat the federal claim,55 or
refusal to consider the merits of a federal claim on the basis of a rule
"more properly deemed discretionary than jurisdictional."'56 Of course,
all other cases in this area pale in interest in comparison to Henry v.
Mississippi.57
As Professor Wright argues, "The question of the adequate state
ground is much confused by the decision in Henry v. Mississippi.... It is
difficult to determine what was held in Henry, much less what effect, if
any, it has on previous notions of the adequate state ground."58 The
Court held in Henry that a state procedural rule of general applicability
still might not be adequate to bar Supreme Court review if the rule
served in the case at bar to defeat a federal claim and did not further a
legitimate state interest.59 Henry was, along with the previous year's
habeas case of Fay v. Noia, ° part of Justice Brennan's drive to find state
54. See, eg., Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22-24 (1920) (Supreme
Court, finding no evidence in record to support state court's factual finding, reviewed state
court refusal to grant Native Americans relief from state taxation because of asserted federal
immunity on the ground that the Native Americans had voluntarily paid the state tax).
55. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 293-302 (1964); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 455-58 (1958). These cases, both part of the same
protracted litigation, concerned Alabama's attempt to bar all NAACP activity in the state,
beginning in 1956, under the state's corporate licensing laws. The United States Supreme
Court twice reversed the Alabama Supreme Court's failure to reach the NAACP's defenses by
raising procedural hurdles never before invoked.
56. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 369 U.S. 229, 234 (1969). Sullivan concerned a
suit against discrimination in the use of community facilities. The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals refused to hear the appeal on the basis of a rule requiring reasonable notice and op-
portunity for opposing counsel to review the trial transcript. The United States Supreme
Court found that while the rule had not been manufactured spontaneously, as in the Alabama
NAACP litigation, supra note 55, it had never before been treated by the Virginia court as a
jurisdictional bar, and therefore did not bar the Court's review. Id. at 233-34.
57. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
58. C. WRIGHT, supra note 43, at 545 (italics added).
59. Henry, 379 U.S. at 447-48.
60. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Fay intimated that any federal claim could now be raised on
habeas by state prisoners. Neither state substantive nor procedural rules could, in this vision,
stand in the way of some sort of ultimate federal review, based either on collateral attack under
a writ of habeas or on direct review because of a weakened view of the adequacy of state
grounds. See, e.g., Sandalow, supra note 1, at 189:
The significance of Henry v. Mississippi is in its intimation that a majority of the
Court apparently are prepared to redefine the adequate state ground doctrine with a
view toward substantial restriction of the situations in which a non-federal ground of
decision will be adequate to preclude review of the federal questions presented.
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bars to Supreme Court review of retrograde state opinions "inadequate."
In this sense, as noted earlier, it is similar to Michigan v. Long.
But there is a distinct difference. It has been widely noted that Jus-
tice Brennan's distinction between substantive and procedural rules
doesn't hold up. While Brennan attempted to justify the holding in
Henry on the contention that, unlike substantive state law, state proce-
dural rules can actually defeat federal claims by barring their airing, state
substantive rules also can defeat federal rights.6 In fact, that is in es-
sence what the case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,62 one of the grandest
and hoariest in constitutional law, was all about.
The significant problem addressed in Henry is that when the scope
given individual rights by the state is more constrained than that recog-
nized by the federal Constitution, allowing state rulings to preclude
Supreme Court review wipes out the supposedly "supreme" federal right.
In contrast, in the Michigan v. Long situation, no federally created right
is defeated if Supreme Court review is precluded, because the scope given
individual rights is actually broader under state law.63 Thus, no Supreme
Court review is actually needed to protect federally guaranteed individ-
ual rights. Under Long, the Court "reaches out" to make clear that
rights under federal law are not as broad as under state law. This is a
pronouncement that need not be made because it will not ultimately af-
fect the duty imposed upon the state's agents in the case at bar.
The habeas prong of the Brennan offensive was beaten back by the Burger Court in Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
61. See Sandalow, supra note 1, at 197-98.
62. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
63. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067-68 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens therefore propounds the view that the Supreme Court should hear cases from state
courts in which individuals have unsuccessfully sought "to vindicate federal rights." Id. at
1068 (emphasis in original). The Court rejects Stevens' view as "novel," overly broad, and
ignorant of the federal interest in state law enforcement. Id. at 1043 n.8; see also supra note 41.
Justice Stevens cites as proper examples of the Court's review, however, cases in which a state
court rejected a federal claim on the basis of a state bar unrelated to the nature of the federal
claim. Long, 463 U.S. at 1069-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The relevance of such cases, how-
ever, is that the state ground is not adequate, not that it is not independent-which it plainly
is.
The problem with Long is not, as Justice Stevens suggests, that it puts the Supreme Court
in the wrong business, upholding government power rather than individual rights, see Long,
463 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting), but rather that such decisions of federal law are
gratuitous. Unless it could be demonstrated that the Michigan Supreme Court's determination
of state constitutional requirements was, in its view, mandated by federal law, the search of
Long's vehicle would be ruled improper and the fruits of the search thrown out of Long's trial
by the state courts, regardless of any lesser constraints the federal Constitution might impose.
There was therefore no reason for the Supreme Court to correct the Michigan Supreme
Court's view of federal law, and to provide an exposition of its own views on the subject,
because to do so would in no way "decide the case."
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In short, while Long-type and Henry-type intervention are both "im-
perialistic" on the Supreme Court's part, Long-type intervention is gratu-
itous, unlike Henry-type intervention, because the Court's expression of
federal law does not change the outcome of the case. Rather, the only
end achieved by the Supreme Court in expounding its view on the Con-
stitution in a Long-type case is to issue a policy pronouncement, not to
affect a specific case's resolution. Henry-type intervention is also con-
cerned with protecting federally guaranteed individual rights; Long-type
intervention is not. What Long protects is federal conceptions of the
powers of government, not conceptions of the rights of individuals.
Now, one might believe that some people place too much emphasis
on "individual rights," and should be more concerned with governmental
authority and capability, particularly in the area of criminal law. That
may be, but the relevant point is that it is the state government whose
powers are being constrained by the state court ruling. If a state chooses
to see itself as more circumscribed in the exercise of power than the fed-
eral Constitution actually requires, then the arguments for Supreme
Court intervention-supremacy, sovereign interpretation of one's own
law, or federalist comity-are all at their weakest.
None of this is to say, however, that the "adequacy" prong of the
"adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine is any the less "im-
perialistic" or potent than the "independence" prong-any more than it
is to say that liberal activist Justices have used the doctrine in pursuit of
substantive goals any less than have conservative activist Justices.
Rather, the basic point is that the "adequate and independent state
grounds" doctrine can be used by any activist Court to "reach out and
touch someone" anytime it chooses.
State courts that seek the security from Supreme Court review possi-
ble if only they include a Michigan v. Long warning label in their opin-
ions still are not perfectly safe from all review. It is possible to "beat the
Court" at the Michigan v. Long game by avoiding discussions of federal
law in state opinions, or by including whatever specific disclaimer the
Court will recognize. It is possible to establish that a state ground is
"independent" of federal law, under whatever standard the Court may
want to impose. But it is never possible wholly to preclude review under
the "adequacy" prong.
As Justice Brennan demonstrated in Henry, if the Supreme Court
wants to dismiss a state ground as "inadequate," it is reasonably easy to
do so.6 The "inadequacy" standard will inevitably be employed, how-
64. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-48 (1965).
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ever, not just to expand individual rights as a matter of federal mandate,
but also to contract them.
It is very much in vogue, at least among "liberals," to extol the
ability of state courts to devise new "individual rights" that the United
States Supreme Court is unwilling to accept at this time.65 For instance,
in the celebrated case of Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,66 a group
of students in California brought suit under the free speech provision of
the state constitution. The students alleged a violation of their constitu-
tional rights by a private shopping center that had them removed from
the property for distributing political leaflets. The First Amendment
would not have protected the students on purely private property,6 7 but
the California Supreme Court ruled that the analogous state constitu-
tional provision did in fact extend such a right.6" The United States
Supreme Court in Pruneyard Shopping Center upheld the power of state
governments to define individual rights more expansively than would the
federal Constitution or the federal courts.69
However, as Earl Maltz, a law professor at Rutgers University,
notes:
[Tihe case also implicated a countervailing right: the right of the
owners to use their property as they saw fit. Accordingly, it is mis-
leading to view the California court's decision for the plaintiffs in
Pruneyard as expanding the scope of individual rights against gov-
ernment interference; it simply elevated the rights of one group
(the students) over those of another (the shopping center
owners).7o
In short, any question of extending (or abridging) an individual's
rights vis-A-vis the government can be transmogrified into a question of
65. For example, many state courts have declared that the state constitution's right of
privacy mandates the availability of public funds for performance of abortions. See Doe v.
Maher, 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 515 A.2d 134 (1986); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. and Fin., 382
Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 173 N.J. Super. 66, 413 A.2d
366, aff'das modified, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982); Doe v. Celani, No. 581-84 (Vt. Super.
CL May 23, 1986); see also Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d
252, 626 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). The United States Supreme Court has held to
the contrary under the federal Constitution. Roe v. Maher, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
66. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
67. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). The exception is the unique instance of
the "company town" in which all normally public property is actually private property. See
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
68. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1979).
69. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 81.
70. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEx. L. RFv. 995, 1008 (1985)
(footnote omitted).
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one individual's rights vis-A-vis another individual's rights.71 This result
should not be too surprising because it is merely the converse of Shelley
v. Kraemer's72 conversion of conflicting private rights into state action.
But once a second individual's rights are at issue, a new possibility arises
that a federal question not even addressed by the state court must neces-
sarily be at issue. For instance, in the Pruneyard Shopping Center case,
what appears to be a question solely of free expression rights under the
California Constitution can, if properly framed, involve instead a ques-
tion of the property owner's due process rights under the federal Consti-
tution. In fact, as the more radical theorists would argue,73 virtually any
government action could be said to implicate the Takings Clause74 or the
Contract Clause.75
In short, no matter how carefully crafted a state law opinion may be
to avoid dependence upon federal law, a state ground will only be "ade-
quate" when the United States Supreme Court either does not oppose its
underlying or resultant policy implications or is unwilling to do some-
thing about it. State grounds will never be securely "adequate and in-
dependent" when the state and federal systems are ideologically out of
line and the United States Supreme Court is activist.76
71. See Gormley, Ten Adventures in State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST.
CONST. L. 29, 50-55 (1988); Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22
WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 631-34 (1981):
[T]he Constitution contains other sorts of values as well. It gives the federal govern-
ment powers, but also enacts limitations on those powers. The limitations, too, count
as setting forth constitutional values.... When a court upholds a state criminal
statute against the claim that it violates the first amendment, it is rejecting one sort of
constitutional claim, but it is also upholding principles of separation of powers and
federalism which themselves have constitutional status.
72. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, the Court confronted the problem of whether it could
utilize the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn racially restrictive covenants in private prop-
erty deeds. The Court overcame this hurdle by reasoning that by giving the private covenant
effect in the state courts under normal principles of property law, the state had engaged in
"state action" sufficient to invoke the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 19-20.
73. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. The Supreme Court has held, for instance, that govern-
ment authorization of air navigation effectuates "takings" requiring compensation. Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
75. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S.
234 (1978); Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941). The most famous use of the Contract Clause
to strike down laws at the heart of the regulatory state was, of course, Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
76. Note that most of the cases using the Long presumption involved situations
where the Court wished to correct state-court overenforcement of federal constitu-
tional restrictions on the enforcement of the criminal law-an area in which the
Court has been active in changing the underlying substantive rules.... Michigan v.
Long thus illustrates a general principle: jurisdictional rules tend to move in the
direction of allowing more intense supervision in areas of the law where the Supreme
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Does this mean that "adequate and independent state grounds" is a
bad doctrine? Certainly not. It means only that it is a doctrine that
requires the vigilance of advocates at the bar to ensure that it is not
honored only in the breach.
Court is in the process of changing the relevant substantive rules and wants to assure
itself that the state courts are complying with the new dispensation.
P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, & D. SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 554 (italics added).
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